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ABSTRACT 
 
We model firms’ incentives to voluntarily adopt corporate governance mechanisms and 
hypothesize that management’s ability to extract private benefits, the need for external funds, and 
the ease with which a firm’s assets may be monitored are important determinants of the level of 
governance. Using hand-collected data, we test these hypotheses and examine firms’ propensity 
to adopt recommended but not required governance standards from their home and neighboring 
country’s jurisdictions. We document that a significant level of voluntary adoption occurs and 
that this level has been both increasing over time and declining in variability across firms. 
Governance mechanisms are least likely to be voluntarily implemented when management 
controls a significant portion of common stock votes or a majority owner exists. In contrast, 
voluntary adoption increases when the firm faces significant investment opportunities and 
employs large levels of expenditures which are difficult to monitor such as research and 
development expenses. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is well-known that corporate governance practices vary significantly from country to 
country (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). While a country’s guidelines and standards provide a general 
framework for these practices, significant variation also occurs domestically among individual 
firms (Klein, Shapiro, and Young, 2004; Gompers Ishii, and Metrick, 2003).  This variability 
suggests that implementing governance practices is in part a voluntary choice. In fact, the laws of 
many countries, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia make explicit the voluntary 
nature of corporate governance.  Corporate governance law in these jurisdictions is two-tiered.  
Like US corporate law, it consists at a first level of voluntary or enabling statutory  
provisions (see Black, 1990).  Yet unlike the US system, these countries also have in place a set 
of best practice guidelines. Firms are not required to implement these guidelines; they are only 
required to disclose which governance practices they have or have not implemented and explain 
why.  
  Unfortunately, we know very little about firms’ governance decisions under these 
voluntary regimes. Have firms implemented additional governance standards over time? What 
motivates some firms to adopt rigorous corporate governance guidelines in the absence of any 
legal requirement to do so while their country cohorts employ relatively lax standards? Do firms 
look beyond their home-country borders when determining which governance standards to 
employ?  This paper seeks to answer these questions by examining firms’ governance practices 
under a voluntary regime, specifically Canada. Canada serves as an ideal test case for two 
primary reasons. First, voluntary Canadian governance guidelines have been in place for a 
relatively long time (since 1995) and second, the proximity of the much larger US capital markets 
makes American legislation a binding concern for Canadian firms with securities currently listed 
in the US and a consideration for those who may list there in the future.  The implementation of 
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heightens the relevance of US corporate governance law globally. 
  We examine the extent to which Canadian firms voluntarily adopt both Canadian and US 
governance standards and whether the level of adoption is dependent on firm-level factors. 
Durnev and Kim (2005) also examine the influence of firm characteristics on the level of 
corporate governance practices.  They find that investment opportunities, external financing, and 
ownership structure are influential determinants of governance practices and that the strength of 
their influence depends in part on a country’s legal environment.  While we will examine the 
influence of some similar characteristics, our study differs from theirs in two primary ways. First, 
we provide explicit evidence that firms voluntarily adopt governance practices over and above 
those required in corporate statutes and that the level of this adoption has been increasing over 
time.  Second, we show that it is not only the home country’s governance regime that influences 
the chosen level of governance but also the standards of neighboring countries, in our case the 
United States. As a result, we contribute to the debate on whether the globalization of financial 
markets leads to convergence in corporate governance practices across countries (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2004; Coffee, 1999; Berglof and von Thadden, 2000).  
  Using a standard principal-agent model we show that incentives exist for management to 
voluntarily commit to governance practices. The model focuses on three factors: 1) the size of 
private benefit that management can extract from the firm, 2) the need for external funds, and 3) 
the cost or ease with which governance mechanisms can be implemented. Using hand-collected 
data from over 1200 information/proxy circulars disclosed in advance of firms’ annual meetings, 
we develop empirical proxies for these factors. For example, management’s ability to extract 
private benefits is assumed to be linked to their personal shareholdings in the firm.  
Our empirical results establish that a significant level of voluntary adoption of the 
Canadian and US guidelines exists and that this level has been increasing over time. In Canada, 
where the guidelines have been in place for a relatively long period of time, we also document a 
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likely to participate when management controls at least 10% of the common stock vote. Similarly, 
governance adoption is low when a majority owner exists. We believe that in these cases, the size 
of management’s private benefit is so large that it exceeds any positive outcome they may occur 
as a result of employing additional governance mechanisms.  In contrast, we find that firms with 
significant investment opportunities are more likely to voluntarily adopt both the domestic 
Canadian governance guidelines and those of the US. In addition, significant spending on 
research and development is associated with additional governance adoption. Since R&D 
expenditures are difficult to monitor and prone to manipulation we believe that firms choose to 
voluntarily adopt additional governance mechanisms to assure investors of the firm’s credibility. 
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II outlines the relevant 
governance regimes for Canadian firms and the practices that they recommend. Section III uses a 
principal-agent model to illustrate incentives that may encourage good governance and develops 
our explicit hypotheses relating firm characteristics to these incentives. Section IV provides the 
empirical specifications for testing these hypotheses and Section V describes the data used in 
these tests. Empirical results are presented in Section VI and Section VII concludes. 
    
II. CANADIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME 
  A significant part of the Canadian corporate governance regime is built on voluntary 
standards.
2 While the basic corporate statute contains both mandatory and voluntary provisions, a 
second layer of governance legislation is premised specifically on the notion of voluntary 
compliance. This second layer has been in place since 1995 when the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSX) issued a list of best practice guidelines that firms could adopt but they were under no legal 
                                                 
2 For comparisons with other legal regimes see Anand (2006). 
  5obligation to do so.
3   These guidelines primarily addressed issues related to the board of 
directors such as its independence and the composition of its committees. 
  Added to the best practice guidelines was a disclosure requirement. While firms were not 
obliged to adopt the voluntary standards, they were mandated to disclose the extent of their 
compliance with the best practices.  This “Statement of Corporate Governance Practices” could 
be contained in the firm’s proxy circular or annual report.
4  In particular, a listed company was 
obliged to make disclosure with reference to the guidelines and where its governance system 
differed from the guidelines, it was to explain the differences.
5   
  Since a large number of Canadian firms are listed on both Canadian and US stock 
exchanges, US corporate governance requirements are as relevant as Canadian guidelines for 
many firms. Most notable among these requirements is of course the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which 
departs from the traditional voluntary structure in place in several countries
6 and mandates firms 
cross-listed in the United States to implement the Act’s provisions.  Thus, Canadian firms listed 
on US exchanges are required to comply with SOX including the listing requirements of US 
exchanges.  As a result, it has been suggested that US corporate governance standards have 
become the de facto guidelines for Canadian firms. Even those firms not currently cross-listed in 
the US (and therefore not mandated to comply with SOX or US listing requirements) may feel 
                                                 
3  See Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada, “Where Were the 
Directors?” Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in Canada, Guideline (12)(i), (1994) [Dey 
Report]. The TSX adopted the Dey Report in February 1995 and on May 3, 1995, released TSE By-Law 
19.17, which requires companies incorporated in a Canadian jurisdiction and listed on the Exchange to 
make disclosure annually regarding their corporate governance practices in an annual report or information 
circular. These guidelines came into effect beginning with companies whose fiscal year ended on June 30, 
1995. See Guidelines, in Toronto Stock Exchange, TSX COMPANY MANUAL § 472 (2004). Section 474 lists 
the fourteen recommendations of the Dey Committee.  
4 See, for example,Guidelines, in Toronto Stock Exchange, TSX COMPANY MANUAL § 473 (2004) 
http://www.tse.com/en/pdf/CompanyManual.pdf [TSX Guidelines]. 
5 The TSX Company Manual, supra note 23 at § 473. Section 474 lists the fourteen recommendations of 
the Dey Committee. Unlike annual reports,  the proxy circular is a mandated document with specific items 
that must be disclosed including corporate governance activities.  Firms tend to disclose their compliance 
with the best practice guidelines in this mandatory document and we restrict our analysis to this document. 
6 For a useful discussion of voluntary corporate governance standards in the E.U. see de Jong et al (2005). 
  6pressure to do so if a significant portion of their peers have adopted the standards.
7  In essence, 
global competition for capital may be a strong incentive for non cross-listed Canadian firms to 
voluntarily adopt US governance mechanisms.  
  It is worth noting that SOX addresses a number of issues that are not duplicated in the 
Canadian corporate governance regime, including: prohibition on insider loans; disclosure of 
material-off balance sheet transactions (the corresponding Canadian rule is weaker); internal 
control procedures, and forfeiture of bonuses in the event of a restatement of a financial document 
that arises as a result of misconduct.  During the time period of this study (pre 2004), SOX further 
differed from Canadian requirements which did not contain financial certification and audit 
committee composition rules.  
  Additional differences between the Canadian and American governance regimes arise 
under the listing rules of US exchanges.  For example, both the NYSE and NASDAQ require a 
majority of independent directors on the board and the compensation committee while these are 
only suggested practices in Canadian jurisdictions.  Thus, for Canadian firms that do not cross-
list, compliance with SOX, US listing standards as well as the TSX guidelines is ultimately 
voluntary. 
 
III. MODELING INCENTIVES FOR VOLUNTARY GOVERNANCE 
 
  Drawing on the work of Tirole (2006) we outline a model of voluntary governance to 
motivate our empirical hypotheses. In this model, the primary determinants for whether or not a 
firm voluntarily employs good governance practices are: 1) the ability of an inside management 
group to extract private benefits for their own gain; 2) the company’s reliance on external funds; 
and 3) the ease with which the company’s assets may be monitored. We hypothesize that firms 
will voluntarily commit to additional governance mechanisms if investors believe these 
                                                 
7  Canadian companies are able to raise capital in the US without cross listing under the Multi-Jurisdictional 
Disclosure System and through exemptions from registration for private offerings as is found in Regulation 
D/Section 4(2) and Rule 144A for example. 
  7mechanisms provide a credible commitment to reducing management’s ability to extract private 
benefits. The need to assure investors that private benefits have been reduced should increase 
with the company’s reliance on external funds. Conflicting predictions exist for the impact of the 
ease of monitoring. All else equal, firms will be more likely to adopt governance mechanisms that 
can be implemented at relatively low cost. However, investors may demand that companies with 
obscure assets or expenses that can be easily manipulated employ effective mechanisms 
regardless of the increased cost associated with monitoring these assets. 
  To illustrate how managerial benefits influence firms’ propensity to implement 
governance mechanisms, we consider a standard principal-agent model with moral hazard where 
an inside management group can alter the probability of success of a random return on a project 
to make it less profitable.
8 This action allows management to receive a private benefit valued at 
B. Therefore management is tempted by the private return to alter their behaviour (to misbehave) 
and invest in a project with a low net present value. In turn, outside investors (at this stage we 
draw no distinction between equity and debt in this risk neutral world), understanding 
management’s incentives, will be wary of investing in the firm. In some cases, the firm may not 
be able to secure outside capital (a case of capital rationing), even though the project has a 
positive net present value.  
  Since investors are sceptical of management’s incentives, management is led to commit 
to credible control structures that will ensure that high, net present value projects will be chosen. 
An example of such a credible mechanism is a governance structure that incorporates monitoring 
systems to ensure that management will not be tempted to misbehave.  The governance system 
chosen and implemented by the firm may be suggested (but not required) by the firm’s home 
jurisdiction (as is the case of Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom) or the firm may choose 
to comply with the guidelines of investor-friendly jurisdictions (for example, Canadian firms 
                                                 
8 Our exposition here closely follows that presented in Tirole (2001) and in more detail Tirole (2006). 
  8voluntarily complying with the standards of SOX) perhaps with the hopes of attracting foreign 
investors.
 9
  Our formal model of voluntary adoption involves three dates. At the first date the firm 
has some initial equity capital A, and decides whether to invest in a project that costs a larger 
amount I. That is, the firm must obtain an amount I-A ≥ 0 from outside investors. At the second 
date, management can choose to behave, and the project will have a probability of success of pH , 
paying R, and zero otherwise. If management misbehaves (and earns a private benefit B) then the 
probability of earning R falls to pL < pH .  Define ΔP = pH  - pL > 0 as the decline in probability 
from misbehaving. Assume that the project has a positive net present value, pH R – I > 0, and for 
simplicity that the risk-free interest rate is zero. Finally, at the third date, the investment pays a 
verifiable return R, or zero.  
  To ensure that risk-neutral investors are willing to finance the firm, we require incentive 
compatibility constraints that will guarantee that management will not misbehave with the outside 
money. First, the risk neutral management must be compensated by an amount w ≥ 0 to forgo the 
private benefit and choose the higher probability project. As a result, w must satisfy  
(pH  - pL )w ≥ B; 
that is, the benefits from choosing the better project must exceed the private reward from 
misbehaving. This implies that the outside investors are constrained in the good outcome to earn 
at most R – [ B / (pH  - pL ) ] without violating management‘s incentives. 
  As a consequence, a necessary and sufficient condition for financing is that: 
pH (R – [ B / (pH  - pL ) ] ) ≥ I – A, or 
pH R – (I – A) ≥  pH [ B / (pH  - pL ) ]. 
                                                 
9 There is a large literature on the impact of legal jurisdictions on investment. La Porta et al (1998) 
document that legal regimes offering strong investor protection have larger capital markets (both debt and 
equity) and more initial public offerings. 
  9That is the expected income for the good project must exceed the investor’s contribution. If we 
assume that there is a competitive investor market, then the inequality will be satisfied with 
equality in equilibrium, and management will receive the residual from their monopoly of inside 
information.
10
  Notice that the amount of inside equity A has a positive benefit in that it allows 
management to circumvent the necessity for large-scale capital raising. In the extreme case where 
I = A, then management can choose the good project, internalizing the loss of efficiency from 
taking the inferior project. Another obvious conclusion is that if management has little ability to 
extract private benefits (we can think of this as being represented by B being small) then the firm 
is much more likely to be funded.  Both of these factors (more inside equity and a lower level of 
managerial private benefits) improve the ability of the firm to raise capital and invest in the 
project. 
  So far we have assumed that management’s ability to extract private benefits from the 
firm has been fixed at the level B. The model can be extended however to demonstrate how the 
firm can commit to additional governance mechanisms, thereby reducing management’s ability to 
extract private benefits to a new level b < B. Within our current model framework, assume that 
governance costs and benefits are built into the returns R and private benefits B. Costly 
monitoring (for example, conforming to suggested Canadian governance guidelines or SOX) 
costs CA  > 0, and reduces the private benefit to b. Now management has a choice between the 
standard financing constraint with no active monitoring:   
pH (R – [ B / (pH  - pL ) ] ) ≥ (I – A) 
and the constraint with costly monitoring resulting in reduced private benefit: 
pH (R – [ b / (pH  - pL ) ] )  - CA   ≥ (I – A) 
                                                 
10 It is easy to show that if pH R – I > 0 > pH (R – [ B / (pH  - pL ) ] ) – (I – A), then a positive net present 
value project will not be funded. This is said to be a case of capital rationing. 
  10Clearly there is a trade-off for management, when choosing the amount of governance, between 
the direct costs of monitoring and the indirect cost of improved incentives. This simple structure 
allows for endogenous choice of corporate governance structures.  If the cost remains the same CA 
 = 0, but governance is more effective (b rather than B) then the firm finds it easier to raise 
outside funds. But in general with CA  > 0, the benefits from lowering B could be more than offset 
by the increased monitoring cost, so that the monitoring system is not used.
11   
  Our model of voluntary governance adoption demonstrates the influence of private 
benefits, external funding requirements, and costly monitoring mechanisms that management 
must assess when establishing its governance structure. The model allows us to develop the 
following three hypotheses. First, if management can extract large private gains (in other words, 
if B is large), they will be less willing to commit to credible governance mechanisms since the 
benefit from choosing the better project is unlikely to exceed management’s private benefits from 
misbehaving. Second, if the amount of funding required for investments, I, is large relative to the 
size of internal equity, A, management will be more likely to commit to additional governance 
mechanisms. And third, if the cost of implementing a governance structure is low so that a 
monitoring system can be easily established, firms will be more likely to voluntarily commit to it 
thereby lowering the level of private benefits from B to b. However, we caution that firms with 
the most difficult (and therefore costly) assets to monitor may continue to employ additional 
governance mechanisms since obscure assets are most prone to managerial manipulation. We turn 
to the next section to describe the empirical proxies that will be used to test these hypotheses. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION OF HYPOTHESES 
  We require proxies for a firm’s level of voluntary governance adoption, its ability to 
extract private benefits, its need for external funding and the ease with which monitoring may be 
                                                 
11 Tirole (2006) interprets changes in the likelihood ratio ((pH  - pL )/ pH) as an indicator of monitoring 
effectiveness. 
  11implemented. To begin, we develop two primary measures of voluntary governance, one referring 
to the suggested Canadian governance guidelines and another reflecting the practices mandated 
by SOX and the listing requirements of US exchanges.  
A. Measures of Voluntary Adoption 
  The majority of the Canadian governance guidelines implemented by the TSX in 1995 
relate to board composition. As a result, our first measure of the voluntary adoption of 
governance mechanisms is an assessment of board quality.  In this assessment we focus on six 
characteristics of boards that were suggested to be good practice by the Canadian guidelines. 
These characteristics include: separation of the CEO and board chair; an independent chair, a 
fully independent audit committee; a fully independent compensation committee; a majority of 
independent directors; and the provision of training for new members. A firm-year observation is 
allocated a point for each of these guidelines that it follows up to a maximum of 6. We denote the 
index by BQ. 
  Our second measure of voluntary adoption referring to aspects of SOX and mandatory 
listing requirements on US exchanges consists of eight components. A firm receives one point for 
each of the following standards that it has implemented: a financial expert on the audit 
committee; the ability of the board to hire advisors; an independent audit committee; an 
independent compensation committee; a code of ethics; financial certification; the elimination of 
internal loans to managers; and a majority of independent directors. We create this measure only 
for Canadian firms that are not cross-listed on a US exchange to ensure that the adoption of these 
standards is truly voluntary. In this way, we can establish whether firms are motivated to 
voluntarily adopt governance guidelines that extend beyond their country’s borders. 
There is some overlap between the US standards and the suggested Canadian best 
practices regime. For this reason we create a variant of the second index that includes only US 
standards that are not also recommended in the Canadian guidelines.  The reduced US 
governance index ranges from zero to five (rather than eight as in the full index). Elements that 
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committees and a majority of independent directors. The five remaining factors are identical to 
those included in the full US index. To distinguish between the two US indices we denote the full 
index by SXFull and the reduced index, excluding overlap with Canadian guidelines by SXEx. 
B. Extracting Private Benefits 
  We have hypothesized that if management can extract large private gains (in other words, 
if B is large), they will be less likely to commit to credible governance mechanisms. We measure 
the ability to extract private benefits by the shareholding characteristics of the firm, particularly 
the existence of block holdings controlling a significant portion of the common stock vote. 
Intuitively a management group with a large voting share will be able to extract more private 
benefits than managers in a widely-held firm that need to appeal to minority investors for their 
voting support. Since we have hypothesized that managers have less incentive to voluntarily 
implement governance guidelines when B is large, then the existence of certain kinds of block 
holdings may be associated with lower voluntary adoption. 
  Firms must disclose in their proxy circulars all individuals or groups holding over 10% of 
the voting power of common shares. We examine these block holders and classify them into one 
of three categories; families, executives, and other investors. Typically, family block holdings are 
possessed by the original founding family of the firm (Morck, Percy, Tan, and Yeung, 2004) 
whereas we define executive block holdings to be holdings maintained by senior management 
members. If an executive is also a member of the family we consider his/her holdings to be part 
of the family block.  
The third group of block holders consists of neither family nor executives.  Instead they 
are typically large institutional investors such as pension or mutual funds. While families and 
executives with significant stock holdings may be less inclined to adopt governance practices 
voluntarily, we suggest that the presence of large institutional investors may in fact encourage the 
  13adoption of additional governance mechanisms in keeping with their monitoring role (Black, 
1990). 
 In addition to identifying the presence of a block holder and whether they represent 
executive, family or other interests, we record the proportion of the common stock votes that the 
block holder controls.  In the extreme, a block holder may maintain the majority of the firm’s 
votes, enabling them to control the direction of the firm with little need to secure the votes of 
minority investors. As a result, we hypothesize that firms with block holders controlling more 
than 50% of voting shares are less likely to voluntarily adopt recommended governance 
guidelines.  
  Two additional shareholding characteristics are suggested to proxy for the ability to 
extract private benefits. The first of these is whether the firm maintains multiple classes of shares 
with differential voting rights (dual class shares).  These shares provide a significant amount of 
control to a small number of individuals at the expense of minority investors and we hypothesize 
that their presence is negatively related to voluntary adoption.  The second is whether the firm 
cross-lists its shares in the US. Of course, this characteristic is relevant only for the voluntary 
adoption of Canadian governance practices reflected by our first governance index since US 
practices are not voluntary for firms listed on US exchanges.  A large literature suggests that 
cross-listing in the US forces firms to be more transparent and improve the quality of their 
disclosures (see Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) and Lang, Raedy and Yetman (2003)). Since firms 
may choose to cross-list their stock to subject themselves to additional regulatory scrutiny and 
thereby signal their high quality, it is possible that these same firms also choose to voluntarily 
adopt additional governance mechanisms. 
C. Need for External Funds 
  We have hypothesized that the greater the external funding requirement, the greater the 
desire to implement additional governance mechanisms. While our model has illustrated a firm’s 
need for external funding to be the result of the difference in the size of the investment (I) and the 
  14amount of internal equity (A), Tirole (2006) extends the theory to allow for other possibilities 
such as the existence of multiple and/or sequential projects. In all cases, the implications are 
similar such that a greater need for external funds (resulting either from a large number of 
projects or a discrepancy between investment opportunities and internal funds) is associated with 
a higher level of voluntary governance adoption. 
  In order to measure a firm’s external funding needs, we adapt two variables from Durnev 
and Kim (2005). In both cases, we deal with the issue of endogeneity by separating the 
measurement of the variables and the level of firm governance over time. The first variable, 
investment opportunity, is measured by the annual percentage growth in sales in the year prior to 
the measurement of the governance indices.  The second variable, which measures the need for 
external finance given a certain level of investment opportunities, is defined as the difference 
between the firm’s sustainable growth rate and its actual growth rate.
12 Any amount of growth 
that the firm cannot support on its own must be funded by external sources. We hypothesize that 
both investment opportunities and need for external finance will be positively related to a firm’s 
voluntary adoption of governance mechanisms. 
D. Ease of Monitoring 
  Management must trade-off the benefit from reducing the size of its private benefit, B, 
with the cost of implementing a governance system (CA ) to achieve this reduction. The cost will 
vary significantly from firm to firm. For example, if the project is relatively transparent to 
understand, where there are tangible assets, etc., then we can think of this as implying 
straightforward and cheap monitoring mechanisms. Conversely, the use of elusive assets, such as 
obscure research and development expenditure will signal a more expensive monitoring 
mechanism since the assets are more difficult to observe and therefore more prone to managerial 
manipulation. To measure the conflicting incentives stemming from low-cost monitoring of 
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employ two variables. First, we use the lagged value of R&D scaled by total assets
13 to proxy for 
the ability of management to manipulate assets and hypothesize that larger values of this variable 
will be associated with more voluntary governance adoption. Second, we use the proportion of 
assets represented by property, plant and equipment to reflect the tangibility of assets. Ex ante it 
is unclear if firms with less tangible assets are motivated to signal their good governance by the 
voluntary adoption of recommended practices or if the additional cost of monitoring these assets 
acts as a deterrent to voluntary adoption.  
 
V. DATA 
  Our sample consists of companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange from 1999 up to 
and including 2003.  We begin our examination in 1999 as this was the year in which the TSX 
attempted to clarify its requirements relating to firm disclosure of governance practices.
14   We 
use 2003 as the upper limit of our period of study since by 2004, Canadian securities regulators 
had adopted two mandatory rules that mirrored the SOX provisions relating to audit committee 
composition and financial statement certification. As a result, 2003 marks the final year in which 
the adoption of suggested governance guidelines was voluntary.  
  The companies chosen for the sample are those included in the S&P/TSX index (formerly 
the TSE300) as of December 31 for each year of our sample period. For each sample firm we 
hand-collect relevant governance data from its proxy circular. We chose to use proxy circulars 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Following Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) sustainable growth is measured as return on 
equity/(1-return on equity) and actual growth is measured as the annual growth rate in total assets. Again 
these values are taken from the year prior to the measurement of the governance variables. 
13 Research and development expenses are frequently missing for observations in Compustat. Rather than 
eliminate observations with missing data, we follow Durnev and Kim’s (2005) practice of replacing 
missing R&D observations with a value of 0. The intuition is that firms that fail to report R&D may do so 
because they do not have R&D expenditures. Eliminating these firms would then bias the sample towards 
industries where R&D spending is significant. 
14 In 1999, the TSX stated that the disclosure should take a certain format. See letter from Clare Gaudet, 
Vice President Corporate Finance Services, Toronto Stock Exchange (Nov. 17, 1999) (on file with 
authors).   
  16since Canadian securities law specifies the type of information that should be disclosed in these 
documents unlike annual reports whose content is not mandated by law. Proxy circulars, for 
instance, must provide a description of board members, their relation to the firm, and details of 
shareholders who hold 10% or more of the firm’s voting shares. Scrutinizing these documents 
allows us to establish whether or not the firm has chosen to implement the suggested Canadian 
governance guidelines. In all, over 1200 proxy circulars were examined with 1048 providing 
sufficient information for the construction of our governance indices.  
  To test our hypotheses related to the incentives for voluntary adoption we require 
additional data from the Compustat database. Unfortunately, not all of our sample firms are 
covered in the Canadian version of Compustat and as a result the sample size declines when we 
move to tests incorporating additional control variables or examining the influence of ease of 
monitoring and the need for external funds on governance. 
 
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Evidence of Voluntary Adoption 
Prior to examining whether certain firm characteristics are associated with increased 
incentives to employ additional governance mechanisms, we provide evidence that voluntary 
adoption occurs for a non-trivial number of firms. We also document that the level of this 
adoption has been greater in the later years of our sample which is intuitive given the recent 
increased focus on corporate governance in both Canada and the United States in recent years. 
   Recall that the index related to the adoption of Canadian guidelines has a maximum value 
of six and is denoted by BQ. Panel A of Table 1 provides values for the average level of the BQ 
index across all firm-year observations and for each year of the sample. The overall average 
across all years is 4.08 whereas the average value in 1999 was lower at 3.72. This average has 
increased monotonically over the years ending with a value of 4.58 in 2003. Univariate tests show 
that the average BQ value has always been statistically greater than zero, implying that a 
  17significant number of firms have voluntarily adopted at least some of the recommended 
guidelines. 
The proportion of firms implementing each of the individual practices that form the index 
is plotted in Figure 1. Similar to the results for the overall index, voluntary adoption has increased 
for all of the individual standards with the most dramatic improvements being the proportion of 
firms providing training for new board members and maintaining fully independent audit 
committees. 
The increase in the average value of the BQ index could be due to either a change in the 
composition of the S&P/TSX index (which forms the basis of our sample) or a change in the 
behaviour of individual firms. It is possible, for instance, that firms with better governance 
mechanisms have entered the index in more recent years, thereby giving the appearance of an 
overall increasing trend in the adoption of governance mechanisms rather than individual firms 
increasing their level of voluntary adoption. To get a sense of the stability of firms’ governance 
structures Table 2 provides a transition matrix for the level of the BQ index from one year to the 
next. Numbers down the vertical axis represent the index value for a particular firm in year T 
while numbers across the horizontal axis represent the level of the index for the same firm in the 
following year, year T+1.  Values within the cells of the matrix represent the number of firms 
with the corresponding levels of the BQ index in two subsequent years. If a firm lies on the 
diagonal, it has maintained the same level of governance mechanisms from one year to the next. 
An observation above the diagonal represents an increase in governance mechanisms over time.  
The transition matrix shows that the bulk of the observations rests on or above the 
diagonal. In other words, firms have been either maintaining or improving the level of 
governance standards that they have adopted from one year to the next. When an improvement 
takes place, it is most commonly an increase of a single point. For example 33 firms increased 
  18their BQ measure from 3 to 4 over a given year while only 4 increased the measure by two points 
from 3 to 5. This pattern is typical across all index levels.
15
  Panel A of Table 1 shows a second interesting phenomenon regarding the voluntary 
adoption of the Canadian governance guidelines over time. At the same time that the general level 
of adoption has increased in recent years, the standard deviation of the BQ index across firm 
observations has declined.  In other words, the extent to which firms adopt the Canadian 
governance guidelines is converging so that there is less variability in governance mechanisms 
from one firm to the next. Formal tests confirm that the standard deviation of the index in 1999 is 
significantly larger than its standard deviation in 2003.  
  A second setting in which voluntary adoption may occur is the implementation of 
standards contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the listing rules of US stock exchanges. Panel 
B of Table 1 reports the two indices reflecting voluntary adoption of US governance standards 
which we denote by SXFull and SXEx . The number of observations in Panel B falls significantly 
from those reported in Panel A for several reasons. First, we focus only on Canadian firms that 
are not cross-listed in the US so that the adoption of American guidelines represents a truly 
voluntary act. Second, we confine our analysis of the US standards to the years 2002 and 2003 
since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not exist prior to this time. Finally, since the reporting of 
governance guidelines that are consistent with US standards is not a requirement for Canadian 
firms, we are more likely to have missing data for the observations in our sample.  
Despite the smaller sample size, Panel B of the table provides evidence that Canadian 
firms consider US standards when choosing which governance mechanisms to adopt.  Average 
values for the full index (SXFull) and the index excluding any Canadian governance elements 
                                                 
15 We examined whether the adoption of a particular governance mechanism by a firm was associated with 
the adoption of others. The most striking results are that having the chair person be someone other than the 
CEO provides little indication of overall governance mechanisms whereas firms with independent chairs 
are much more likely to also have independent committees and provide training for members of the board. 
  19(SXEx) are both significantly greater than 0 in 2002 and 2003.  In addition, we witness the same 
pattern of increasing levels of adoption over time as was apparent for the Canadian indices.  
B. Incentives for Voluntary Adoption of Canadian Guidelines 
1. Ability to Extract Private Benefits 
We have hypothesized that the ability to extract significant private benefits through 
shareholding characteristics such as large block holdings or dual class shares provides 
management with little incentive to voluntarily adopt mechanisms that ensure the selection of 
high NPV projects. Table 3 provides average values of the BQ index for firms with various 
shareholding characteristics and gives the results of univariate tests as to whether these 
characteristics result in significantly lower levels of voluntary adoption from the remaining 
sample. It is immediately apparent that firms with a majority shareholder have the worst average 
score for the index followed by those with executive block holdings. In both cases, these firms 
score significantly worse than the rest of the sample. Lower than average scores are also 
associated with the presence of dual class shares and family block holdings. 
The univariate tests ignore the relationships among various shareholding characteristics. 
Panel B of Table 3 illustrates these relationships by providing a correlation matrix for the 
shareholding characteristics and documents that firms with majority shareholders are also likely 
to have dual classes of shares outstanding. This is unsurprising since it is usually through the 
ownership of shares with disproportionately high voting rights that an individual or group is able 
to control over 50% of a company’s votes. Since the correlation between these two characteristics 
is in excess of 0.5, we refrain from including both variables in the same specification when 
moving to multivariate regressions.
16  
Table 4 provides the first of the multivariate regressions with the level of the BQ index 
being the dependent variable and indicators for dual classes of shares, cross-listed securities and 
  20the presence of family, executive or institutional block holdings being the independent variables. 
In addition to the shareholding characteristics, we include three control variables for factors that 
may also influence governance. The first of these is the year of observation. We construct a 
variable called Year Count which is set equal to 0 in 1999, 1 in 2000 etc. until reaching a 
maximum of 4 in 2003. In addition, we control for a firm’s size (as measured by the Ln of the 
lagged value of assets) and its industry. Since different industries may have different norms with 
respect to the appropriate level of governance, we create 13 industry dummies identified by 2-
digit SIC codes as in Campbell (1996). Robust standard errors accounting for the presence of 
multiple observations from the same firm are used for all regressions reported in Tables 4 through 
7.
17
Results in the first column of Table 4 show that the presence of an executive block 
holding is the most significant determinant of voluntary governance adoption among our 
shareholding characteristics. When management controls at least 10% of common share votes 
they are significantly less likely to voluntarily implement the recommended Canadian governance 
standards. This is precisely what our model has predicted: if management is able to extract 
significant private benefits (B is large) there is little incentive for good governance. 
There is weak evidence that the presence of a family block holding also reduces the 
propensity to adopt governance standards. The family block indicator shows a negative 
relationship to the BQ index at approximately the 10 percent level.
18 In contrast to executive and 
family blocks, our intuition suggested that the presence of an institutional investor may encourage 
rather than dissuade companies to improve their governance standards. Unfortunately, we do not 
find that having an independent block holder improves firm board quality. Similarly, there is no 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 Dual class shares are also correlated with family block holdings. While the correlation is not as severe as 
in the case of a majority owner, we conduct additional robustness tests to ensure that multicollinearity is 
not biasing our results. 
17 A Hausman test rejects the use of a random effects model rather than robust standard errors.  
  21evidence to suggest that having shares cross-listed in the US improves the BQ index. In terms of 
the control variables, Year Count is positively related to governance adoption confirming the 
trend of increasing levels adoption observed in Figure 1 while firm size has no bearing on 
voluntary governance. 
19
The second regression specification presented in Table 4 adds the majority voter variable 
and removes the dual class share indicator due to the strong correlation between the two. As the 
univariate statistics suggested, having a controlling shareholder is negatively associated with the 
voluntary adoption of governance standards. This implies that majority owners have little 
incentive to appeal to minority investors by instituting good governance practices. Other results 
remain similar to the first specification. Recent years are again associated with better governance 
as is the absence of an executive block. Interestingly, the executive block variable remains 
significant even when it is defined to capture only those blocks representing a non-majority stake 
in the firm.
20  An executive block holding is always associated with worse scores on the BQ 
index regardless of whether this block represents a controlling position or not. 
2. Need for External Funds and Ease of Monitoring 
  A greater need for external funds due to significant investment opportunities (proxied by 
historical sales growth) or a significant discrepancy between the amount of internal equity on 
hand and the magnitude of a company’s investment opportunities (proxied by the difference 
between a company’s sustainable and actual growth rates) are hypothesized to be associated with 
greater voluntary governance adoption. While it is plausible that more tangible assets are easier to 
observe and therefore less costly to monitor, this reduction in cost may not necessarily be 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 The calculation of variance inflation factors shows that while multicollinearity exists among the variables 
within this specification, it is not severe. Nevertheless when the dual share variable is removed from the 
regression, the family block dummy increases in importance. 
19 Replacing the Year Count variable with dummy variables indicating the year provides similar evidence. 
Dummy variables are highly significant for more recent years. We do not report coefficients for the 13 
industry dummies in order to conserve space. 
20 A third model specification was estimated in which the three block holding variables were redefined to 
refer to executive, family, and other block holdings with control over 10 to 49 percent of the votes. When 
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expenses for example may employ additional governance mechanisms to ensure investors of their 
legitimacy. 
Table 5 presents results for multivariate regressions relating our external funding and 
ease of monitoring variables to the BQ index. The first specification reports the coefficient 
estimates for the measures of investment opportunity, need for external finance, R&D, and 
property, plant and equipment in addition to the size, industry, and year controls. The second and 
third specifications add the shareholding characteristics analyzed in Table 4. The second 
specification ignores the proportion of votes maintained by block holders while the third includes 
the majority voter variable. 
The results suggest that the need for external funds as measured by a company’s 
investment opportunities is a significant factor in their choice of governance structure. As 
hypothesized, firms with significant investment opportunities choose to adopt more of the 
recommended Canadian guidelines. This is intuitive given that these firms may be seeking to 
attract investors to fund these opportunities. The inclusion of the external funds variables do little 
to alter the relationships documented in Table 4. In particular, the presence of an executive block 
holder or majority voter continues to be associated with lower levels of voluntary adoption and 
the Year Count variable maintains its significance.  
Table 5 also provides evidence that the nature of the assets being funded is an important 
determinant of the adoption of governance mechanisms. Consistent with Durnev and Kim (2005), 
we find that firms with higher levels of research and development expenses are more likely to 
voluntarily adopt additional governance mechanisms. The tangibility of assets as measured by the 
proportion of property, plant and equipment is also positively associated with governance 
                                                                                                                                                 
these variables were included in a regression with the majority voter variable, the estimated coefficient for 
executive block holdings was still negatively related to the BQ index value. 
  23adoption. This relationship however is not statistically significant and we can draw no conclusion 
as to whether tangible assets that are cheaper to monitor encourage additional governance. 
C. Incentives for Voluntary Adoption of US Guidelines 
  Tables 6 and 7 ask whether the same incentives encourage firms to voluntarily adopt the 
governance standards of a neighboring country, in this case the US, as the adoption of domestic 
standards. Panel A of each table relates the full US standards index (SXFull) to the shareholding, 
external funds, and ease of monitoring characteristics whereas Panel B focuses on the reduced 
index excluding any overlap with Canadian guidelines (SXEx). Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is 
only relevant for observations in 2002 and 2003, the Year Count variable is replaced with a 
dummy that identifies observations from 2003. Unlike previous tables, the 13 industry 
classifications are excluded from the control variables due to the smaller sample size. Firm size 
continues to be accounted for by the inclusion of the Ln of lagged assets. 
Table 6 illustrates that regardless of whether the independent variable is SXFull or SXEx, 
shareholding characteristics have little impact on a firm’s propensity to voluntarily adopt US 
governance standards. While the presence of a majority voter and family and executive block 
holders are associated with lower levels of the SXFull index in that the estimated coefficients are 
negative, none of the relations are statistically significant at conventional levels. Results are even 
weaker when focusing only on US standards that do not overlap with Canadian guidelines. The 
only variable that appears to be of any consequence in influencing the level of adoption of US 
standards is whether the observation is from the year 2003. Again, we find evidence of an 
increasing level of voluntary adoption of governance in more recent years. 
Including additional explanatory variables related to the need for external funds and ease of 
monitoring provides more encouraging results. While the shareholding characteristics remain 
unimportant, the investment opportunity variable becomes significant in all specifications. 
Consistent with the Canadian evidence, we find that firms with greater levels of investment 
  24opportunities are more likely to voluntarily adopt the US standards. This is the case regardless of 
whether these standards are measured by the SXFull or SXEx index.  
One interesting difference arises between Panels A and B of Table 7. While firm size is not a 
consistently significant factor in determining the level of adoption of Canadian guidelines or US 
standards that overlap with the Canadian recommendations, it becomes an important variable 
when examining SXEx. When the adoption of US standards is examined in isolation, we find that 
larger Canadian firms are more likely to voluntarily implement these mechanisms. This result is 
intuitive in light of the observation that the average size of cross-listed firms in our sample is over 
2.5 times that of non cross-listed firms. It may therefore be the larger firms that are more likely to 
cross-list shares in upcoming years. As a result, they may begin implementing SOX standards in 
preparation for executing future US financings.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We have illustrated that a standard principal-agent model can be used to demonstrate 
incentives that exist for firms to voluntarily implement governance mechanisms in the absence of 
any legal requirement to do so. The particular incentives that we explore are the ability of 
management to extract private benefits from the firm, the need for external funds, and the 
ease/cost associated with implementing a governance system.  
Using hand-collected data from proxy circulars, we have examined the behavior of Canadian 
companies under the domestic best practices regime and the impact of US governance 
requirements on firms not listed on U.S. stock exchanges.  In both instances, there is no 
requirement for firms to adopt suggested governance guidelines and yet we have found 
significant evidence that they do so voluntarily.  
The extent to which voluntary governance guidelines are implemented has increased 
considerably in recent years. For the Canadian guidelines, which have been in place much longer, 
  25we find evidence of convergence in the level of adoption of suggested practices. The standard 
deviation of our governance measure has decreased significantly over time. 
Our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that management is less willing to 
implement governance mechanisms ensuring the adoption of positive NPV projects if they are 
able to extract significant private benefits. When management controls at least 10% of the 
common share vote, the voluntary adoption of practices designed to improve board quality is 
significantly reduced. Similarly, the presence of a majority owner results in less voluntary 
adoption of recommended guidelines. 
The need for external funds due to the presence of significant investment opportunities serves 
as a significant motivator for firms to implement both the Canadian and US standards. Higher 
values for the BQ index, SXFull and SXEx are all positively related to investment opportunities. The 
BQ index also improves for firms with high levels of research and development expenditures. 
These expenditures may be more susceptible to managerial manipulation and it appears that 
companies implement the recommended governance guidelines to assure investors that this 
manipulation has not occurred.  
The relatively recent enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and the corresponding change in 
the listing requirements for US stock exchanges limit historical data availability. Early indications 
however suggest that larger Canadian firms with significant investment opportunities are more 
likely to voluntarily implement US regulations. We can only speculate that these may be firms 
that are more likely to seek access to US capital markets in the future. Global competition for 
financing may motivate firms to voluntarily adopt the governance practices of foreign 
jurisdictions in the hopes of appealing to international investors. Our empirical results are 
consistent with competition for capital being a more important determinant of governance 
structure than mandatory legislation. 
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  28Table 1: Summary Statistics and Univariate Tests for the BQ Index (range 0-6), Full US 
Standards Index (range 0-8) and US Standards Index Excluding Canadian Elements (range 
0-5) 
 
Panel A: BQ Index by Year 
 
Fiscal Year  N  BQ   Standard 
Deviation 
T-Stat BQ  > 0 
 
1999 204  3.72  1.57  33.83** 
2000 208  3.87  1.53  36.52** 
2001 244  3.98  1.45  42.79** 
2002 188  4.32  1.39  42.78** 
2003 204  4.58  1.26  51.94** 
All Years  1048  4.08  1.47  89.66** 
      
Panel B: US Standards Indices by Year 
 
Fiscal Year  N 
Full SX   Standard 
Deviation 
T-Stat SX  > 0 
 
Full US Index        
2002 62  4.37  1.37  25.12** 
2003 66  5.31  1.24  34.78** 
All Years  128  4.86  1.38  39.71** 




Ex SX   Standard 
Deviation 
T-Stat SX  > 0 
 
2002 65  2.15  0.96  18.17** 
2003 66  2.83  1.02  22.64** 
All Years  131  2.50  1.04  27.46** 
* Indicates significance at the 5% level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
Panel A of the table provides the mean value of the board quality index (BQ ) for each year in 
our sample. The index value ranges from 0 to 6 and represents the extent to which the sample 
firms voluntarily adopt 6 governance practices recommended by the Toronto Stock Exchange that 
are related to the composition of the board of directors. Panel B represents the extent to which 
non-crosslisted Canadian firms voluntarily adopt governance standards suggested by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the listing standards of American stock exchanges. The first portion of 
the panel reflects the mean value of an index ( Full SX ) ranging from 0-8 whereas the second 
portion of the panel refers to the mean value of an index ( Ex SX ) that excludes 3 governance 
characteristics that overlap with the Toronto Stock Exchange guidelines. The maximum value for 
this index is therefore 5. 
  29Table 2: Voluntary Adoption of BQ Index Elements 
 
Panel A: Transition Matrix for the BQ Index 
 
  BQ Index at time T+1 
  0 1 2  3  4 5 6 
BQ at time T           
0   2  1      
1  1 12  11  7  4     
2    6 34 19 12 5 3 
3    1 7 55 33  4 8 
4    1  6  15  94 24 20 
5    2  2  2  10 62 22 
6     1 3 5  13  104 
           
 
The table provides a transition matrix for the BQ index values over time. Values within each cell 
represent the number of firms within the sample that maintained the corresponding values of the 
BQ index in years T and T+1. Firms falling in the diagonal cells did not change their governance 
standards (as measured by the BQ index) from one year to the next. Firms falling in cells above 
the diagonal voluntarily adopted additional BQ guidelines over the course of a year. 
 
  30 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of BQ Index and Shareholding Characteristics 
 
Panel A: BQ Index by Shareholding Characteristic 
 





0 = − with without BQ BQ
 
Cross-Listed 436 4.28  3.91  -3.90** 
Dual Shares  302  3.66  4.25  6.19** 
Family Block  144  3.69  4.16  3.86** 
Executive Block  205  3.21  4.30  10.18** 
Other Block  476  4.13  4.05  -0.87   
Majority Voter  284  3.38  4.38  10.21** 
        














Cross-Listed  1.00         
Dual  Shares  -0.10**  1.00       
Family Block  -0.10**  0.37**  1.00       
Executive Block  -0.12**  0.16**  -0.18**  1.00     
Other Block  -0.07*  -0.01  -0.15**  -0.09**  1.00   
Majority Voter  -0.12**  0.54**  0.39**  0.17**  0.06*  1.00 
         
* Indicates significance at the 5% level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
Panel A of Table 3 provides the average value for the board quality index (BQ ) for firms with a 
particular shareholding characteristic and compares this to the average value for the remaining 
observations in the sample. The shareholding characteristics examined include whether the firm’s 
stock is cross-listed on a US exchange, whether it has multiple classes of shares with differential 
voting rights (dual shares), whether family, executive or another group/individual owns a block of 
shares representing at least 10% of the common share votes and whether any group/individual 
controls over 50% of the votes (majority voter). Panel B of the table shows the correlation 
between these shareholding characteristics. 
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Table 4: Influence of Shareholding and Firm Characteristics on Voluntary Adoption of BQ 
Guidelines 
 
Voluntary Adoption of BQ Index vs Shareholding Characteristics 
       
  Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Constant  4.02** 9.52 3.74** 8.96 
      
Shareholding      
Dual Shares  -0.07  -0.40     
Cross-List  -0.09 -0.53 -0.12 -0.74 
Family  Blk.  -0.43 -1.68 -0.14 -0.55 
Exec.  Blk  -1.20** -6.27 -1.03** -5.26 
Other Blk.  -0.04  -0.30  0.04  0.27 
Majority Voter      -0.75**  -3.50 
      
Controls      
Year  Count  0.23** 6.66 0.24** 7.09 
Ln  Assets  0.03 0.57 0.07 1.59 
Industry  YES  YES  
      
N  758  748  
R
2 0.19  0.22  
       
* Indicates significance at the 5% level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
Table 4 provides the coefficient estimates for a regression relating the level of the board quality 
(BQ) index to firm shareholding characteristics and control variables. Shareholding 
characteristics include whether the firm’s stock is cross-listed on a US exchange, whether it has 
multiple classes of shares with differential voting rights (dual shares), whether family, executive 
or another group/individual owns a block of shares representing at least 10% of the common 
share votes and whether any group/individual controls over 50% of the votes (majority voter). 
Control variables include the year of the observation (Year Count = 0 in 1999, 1 in 2000 etc.), 
firm size (as measured by the ln of total assets) and the firms’ industry classification based on 2-
digit sic codes. Since firms with a majority voter frequently have dual classes of shares 
outstanding, these two variables are not included in the same specification of the model to avoid 
problems of multicollinearity. Robust standard errors account for the presence of multiple 
observations from the same firm over time. 
  32Table 5: Influence of Shareholding and Firm Characteristics on Voluntary Adoption of BQ 
Guidelines 
 
Voluntary Adoption of BQ Index Elements vs. Firm and Shareholding Characteristics 
          
  Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Constant  2.72** 5.41 3.31** 6.31 3.03** 5.82 
        
Funding        
Invest.  Opp.  0.02**  2.84 0.02* 2.28 0.02* 2.44 
External  Fin.  -0.03 -0.86 -0.02 -0.75 -0.02 -0.68 
        
Ease of 
Monitoring 
      
R&D  3.70** 3.69  2.63*  2.47 2.71** 2.61 
PPE  0.41 1.73 0.32 1.34 0.38 1.66 
        
Shareholding        
Dual  Shares     -0.07  -0.34    
Cross-List      -0.14 -0.82 -0.16 -0.94 
Family  Blk.      -0.39 -1.39 -0.12 -0.43 
Exec.  Blk      -1.00** -4.75 -0.86** -3.98 
Other  Blk.      -0.11 -0.69 -0.03 -0.21 
Majority  Voter       -0.70**  -3.17 
        
Controls        
Year  Count  0.27** 6.23 0.26** 5.61 0.26** 5.68 
Ln  Assets  0.08 1.66 0.07 1.30 0.11  2.23* 
Industry  YES  YES  YES  
        
N  631  590  582  
R
2 0.12  0.19  0.23  
          
* Indicates significance at the 5% level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
Table 5 provides the coefficient estimates for a regression relating the level of the board quality 
(BQ) index to firm funding, ease of monitoring, shareholding, and control characteristics. 
Shareholding and control characteristics are defined as in Table 4. Funding characteristics 
represent the firm’s investment opportunities (measured by the previous year’s sales growth) and 
its need for external financing (measured by the difference between actual growth and sustainable 
growth in the previous year). The cost/ease with which the firm can be monitored are represented 
by lagged research and development expenses scaled by total assets (R&D), and property, plant 
and equipment scaled by total assets (PPE). Low levels of R&D and high levels of PPE 
correspond to a high degree of observability, implying that the firm’s assets are easier to monitor. 
Robust standard errors account for the presence of multiple observations from the same firm over 
time. 
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Table 6: Influence of Shareholding and Firm Characteristics on Voluntary Adoption of US 
Governance Standards 
Panel A: Voluntary Adoption of the Full US Standards Index vs 
Shareholding Characteristics 
       
  Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient  T-Stat 
Constant 3.72**  5.33  3.68**  5.14 
       
Shareholding       
Dual Shares  -0.23  -0.69     
Family  Blk.  -0.69 -1.69 -0.68  -1.78 
Exec.  Blk  -0.30 -0.80 -0.31  -0.77 
Other  Blk.  0.23 0.91 0.25  0.95 
Majority Voter      -0.28  -0.81 
       
Controls       
2003 Dummy  0.87**  4.17  0.85**  4.16 
Ln  Assets  0.13 1.46 0.14  1.51 
Industry  NO  NO   
       
N 102    99   
R
2 0.20  0.20   
Panel B: Voluntary Adoption of the US Standards Index Excluding 
Canadian Elements vs Shareholding Characteristics 
       
  Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient  T-Stat 
Constant 1.04  1.91  1.29*  2.47 
       
Shareholding       
Dual Shares  -0.41  -1.46     
Family Blk.  0.13  0.45  -0.16  -0.49 
Exec.  Blk  0.12 0.43 0.10  0.34 
Other  Blk.  0.31 1.33 0.14  0.60 
Majority Voter      0.28  1.08 
       
Controls       
2003 Dummy  0.72**  4.17  0.73**  4.21 
Ln Assets  0.15*  2.11  0.10  1.56 
Industry  NO  NO   
       
N  104  101   
R
2 0.18  0.16   
* Indicates significance at the 5% level 
**Indicates significance at the 1% level  
 
Panel A of Table 6 provides coefficient estimates for a regression relating the voluntary adoption 
of governance standards proposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and US stock exchange 
listings to firm shareholding and control characteristics. The dependent variable in Panel A 
represents an index ranging in value from 0-8 to account for the voluntary adoption of up to 8 US 
standards. The dependent variable in Panel B is an index ranging from 0-5 that excludes 3 US 
  34standards from the index in Panel A that overlap with the recommended guidelines from the 
Toronto Stock Exchange. The sample consists of observations from Canadian firms without 
listings on US stock exchanges in the years following the introduction of SOX (2002 and 2003). 
Due to the reduced sample size and scope, industry controls are not included in the regression and 
the Year Count variable is replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations from 2003 
and 0 for observations from 2002. All other variables are as defined in Table 4.  Robust standard 
errors account for the presence of multiple observations from the same firm over time. 
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Table 7: Influence of Shareholding and Firm Characteristics on Voluntary Adoption of US 
Governance Standards  
 
Panel A: Voluntary Adoption of Full US Standards Index vs. Firm and Shareholding 
Characteristics 
          
  Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Constant  2.82**  2.72 2.72* 2.56 2.56* 2.34 
        
Funding        
Invest.  Opp.  0.02*  2.41 0.02** 2.70 0.02** 2.67 
External  Fin.  -0.00 -0.02 -0.08 -0.49 -0.10 -0.62 
        
Ease of 
Monitoring 
      
R&D  -0.05 -0.01 -0.56 -0.15 -0.64 -0.17 
PPE  0.57 1.45 0.72 1.81  0.86*  2.17 
        
Shareholding        
Dual  Shares     -0.18  -0.48    
Family  Blk.      -0.78 -1.83 -0.74 -1.91 
Exec.  Blk      -0.26 -0.66 -0.25 -0.61 
Other  Blk.      0.22 0.83 0.23 0.84 
Majority  Voter       -0.38  -1.11 
        
Controls        
2003  Dummy  0.78** 3.99 0.84** 4.06 0.83** 4.00 
Ln  Assets  0.17 1.44 0.20 1.68 0.22 1.82 
Industry  NO  NO  NO  
        
N  100   98  95  
R
2 0.15  0.27  0.29  
          
 
*Indicates significance at the 5% level 
**Indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
  36 Table 7 Continued 
Panel B: Voluntary Adoption of US Standards Index Excluding Canadian Elements vs. 
Firm and Shareholding Characteristics 
          
  Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Constant  0.76 1.17 0.40 0.53 0.52 0.68 
        
Funding        
Invest.  Opp.  0.01* 2.08 0.01* 2.55 0.01* 2.21 
External  Fin.  0.02 0.16 -0.04  -0.29 0.01 0.05 
        
Ease of 
Monitoring 
      
R&D  -2.15 -0.73 -1.82 -0.60 -1.76 -0.54 
PPE  0.59  1.90 0.65* 2.39 0.72* 2.45 
        
Shareholding        
Dual  Shares     -0.36  -1.22    
Family Blk.      0.02  0.05  -0.25  -0.75 
Exec.  Blk      0.09 0.36 0.09 0.33 
Other  Blk.      0.26 1.03 0.07 0.28 
Majority  Voter       0.21  0.78 
        
Controls        
2003  Dummy  0.58** 3.89 0.65** 3.96 0.66** 3.85 
Ln  Assets  0.15* 2.02 0.19* 2.29 0.16* 1.97 
Industry  NO  NO  NO  
        
N  102  100   97   
R
2 0.20  0.27  0.25  
          
*Indicates significance at the 5% level 
**Indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
Panel A of Table 7 provides coefficient estimates for a regression relating the voluntary adoption 
of governance standards proposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and US stock exchange 
listings to firm funding, shareholding and control characteristics. The dependent variable in Panel 
A represents an index ranging in value from 0-8 to account for the voluntary adoption of up to 8 
US standards. The dependent variable in Panel B is an index ranging from 0-5 that excludes 3 US 
standards from the index in Panel A that overlap with the recommended guidelines from the 
Toronto Stock Exchange. The sample consists of observations from Canadian firms without 
listings on US stock exchanges in the years following the introduction of SOX (2002 and 2003). 
Due to the reduced sample size and scope, industry controls are not included in the regression and 
the Year Count variable is replaced with a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations from 2003 
and 0 for observations from 2002. All other variables are as defined in Tables 4 and 5.  Robust 
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Figure 1: The figure represents the proportion of sample firms that voluntarily adopt each of the 6 
governance guidelines incorporated in the BQ index. The index reflects recommended practices 
from the Toronto Stock Exchange that refer to the composition of the board of directors. 
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